# Stable Matching

## Definition

**Goal**: Given n men and n women, find a "suitable" matching.

- Participants rate members of opposite sex.
- Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
- Each woman lists men in order of preference from best to worst.

特征：二分图，按照优先度排序

**Unstable pair**: applicant x and hospital y are unstable if:

- x prefers y to its assigned hospital
- y prefers x to one of its admitted students.

**Stable assignment**: Assignment with no unstable pairs.

- Natural and desirable condition.
- Individual self-interest will prevent any applicant/hospital deal from being made.

**Perfect matching**: everyone is matched monogamously

- Each man gets exactly one woman.
- Each woman gets exactly one man.

**Stability**：no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action。

- In matching M, an unmatched pair m-w is unstable if man m and woman w prefer each other to current partners.
- Unstable pair m-w could each improve by eloping.

**Stable matching**：perfect matching with no unstable pairs.

**Stable matching problem**: Given the **preference lists** of n men and n women, find a stable matching if one exists.

稳定匹配不一定存在，如分配室友：

Stable roommate problem：

- 2n people; each person ranks others from 1 to 2n-1.
- Assign roommate pairs so that no unstable pairs.

此反例可以结合二分图中的相关证明理解

## Gale-Shapley Algorithm

```
Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
Choose such a man m
w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
if (w is free)
assign m and w to be engaged
else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free
else
w rejects m
}
```

## Proof of Correctness

### Termination

Observation:

- Men propose to women in decreasing order of preference
- Once a woman is matched, she never becomes unmatched; she only "trades up."

Claim: Algorithm terminates after at most $n^2$ iterations of while loop.

Each time through the while loop a man proposes to a new woman. There are only n2 possible proposals.

### Perfection

Claim. All men and women get matched.

Pf. (by contradiction)

- Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that Zeus is not matched upontermination of algorithm.
- Then some woman, say Amy, is not matched upon termination.
- By Observation 2, Amy was never proposed to.
- But, Zeus proposes to everyone, since he ends up unmatched. ▪

### Stability

Claim. No unstable pairs.

Pf. (by contradiction)

- Suppose A-Z is an unstable pair: each prefers each other topartner in Gale-Shapley matching S*.
- Case 1: Z never proposed to A.
- Z prefers his GS partner to A.
- A-Z is stable.
- Case 2: Z proposed to A.
- A rejected Z (right away or later)
- A prefers her GS partner to Z.
- A-Z is stable.
- In either case A-Z is stable, a contradiction. ▪

## Efficient Implementation

Representing men and women：

- Assume men are named 1, …, n.
- Assume women are named 1', …, n'.

Engagements：

- Maintain a list of free men, e.g., in a queue
- Maintain two arrays
`wife[m]`

, and`husband[w]`

. - set entry to 0 if unmatched
- if m matched to w then wife[m]=w and husband[w]=m

Men proposing:

- For each man, maintain a list of women, ordered by preference
- Maintain an array
`count[m]`

that counts the number of proposalsmade by man`m`

.

也可以基于链表实现，删除头节点即可

Women rejecting/accepting：

- For each woman, create
**inverse**of preference list of men. - Constant time access for each query after O(n) preprocessing.

## Other Understanding

- 对于解不唯一的样例，Gale-Shapley 算法总会给出相同的匹配吗？

**valid partner**: Man m is a**valid partner**of woman w if there exists some stablematching in which they are matched.**Man-optimal assignment**: Each man receives best valid partner.

All executions of GS yield **man-optimal assignment**, which is a stable matching.

主动方占优，该算法男性主动发出匹配请求。

### Man Optimality

Claim. _*GS matching S* is man-optimal._*

Pf. (by contradiction)

- (S* ) Suppose some man is paired with someone other than bestpartner. Men propose in decreasing order of preference someman is rejected by valid partner.
- (S* ) Let Y be **first** such man, and let A be **first** valid woman that rejects him.
- Let S be a stable matching where A and Y are matched.
- (S* ) **When Y is rejected, A forms (or reaffirms) engagement with a man, say Z, whom she prefers to Y**.
- Let B be Z's partner in S.
- (S* ) Z not rejected by any valid partner at the point when Y is rejected by A. Thus, **Z prefers A to B**. (2,4)
- (S* ) But **A prefers Z to Y**. (4)
- Thus A-Z is unstable in S.

### Woman Pessimality

**Woman-pessimal assignment**. Each woman receives worst valid partner.

Claim. GS finds **woman-pessimal** stable matching S*

Pf.

- Suppose A-Z matched in S*, but Z is not worst valid partner for A.
- There exists stable matching S in which A is paired with a man, sayY, whom she likes less than Z.
- Let B be Z's partner in S.
- Z prefers A to B (in S*. A and B are both valid partners). [man-optimality]
- Thus, A-Z is an unstable in S